Case Commentaries by unknown
 249 
CASE COMMENTARIES 
ARBITRATION 
When Suing on Behalf  of  Its Membership, a Medical Association Is Bound 
by Its Members’ Compulsory Arbitration Agreements.  Tenn. Med. Ass’n v. 
Bluecross Blueshield of  Tenn., No. M2005-01278-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007). 
By Jennifer Gower 
 The recent boom of  litigation involving managed care entities has forced 
courts to make important distinctions between direct claims for relief  filed by 
medical associations and those claims filed on behalf  of  their memberships.  Medical 
associations bringing derivative claims on behalf  of  their memberships are generally 
bound by the same limitations as the members they represent.  This prevents the 
members from requesting that the association sue on their behalf  simply to avoid 
their contractual commitments.  This ―nationwide attack on the actions of  managed 
care entities‖ also leaves courts to determine what types of  injury affords these 
medical associations the protection provided by statutes such as the Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act (the ―Act‖).  In Tennessee Medical Association v. Bluecross 
Blueshield of  Tennessee, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed the standing of  the 
Tennessee Medical Association (―TMA‖) to sue under the Act and the binding effect 
of  its members‘ compulsory arbitration agreements on determining the proper 
forum.    
In 2002, TMA filed a lawsuit against Bluecross Blueshield of  Tennessee 
(―BCBST‖) asserting that BCBST violated the Act by ―bundling, downcoding, and 
otherwise underpaying TMA members.‖  TMA also alleged that BCBST breached its 
contract and violated the Tennessee Prompt Pay Act.  The trial court granted 
BCBST‘s motion to dismiss TMA‘s complaint on the following grounds:  (1) TMA 
did not have a contractual relationship with BCBST; (2) TMA cannot assert a claim 
of  derivative breach of  contract when it is not the third-party beneficiary of  the 
contract; (3) TMA is not the submitter of  claims as is required for claims brought 
under the Tennessee Prompt Pay Act; (4) if  TMA did meet the above qualifications 
the matters should be resolved through arbitration; and (5) TMA is not entitled to 
remedies under the Act because it did not identify a ―trade, commerce, or consumer 
transaction‖ that satisfies the terms of  the Act.   
 On appeal, TMA raised two issues.  The first was whether the trial court 
correctly held that TMA was not ―affected‖ and did not suffer a loss due to BCBST‘s 
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violations of  the Act, thus failing to bring TMA within the scope of  the Act.  The 
second issue was whether TMA‘s private enforcement action is subject to arbitration 
when TMA and BCBST did not enter a binding arbitration agreement.   
 The Tennessee Legislature enacted the Act to protect persons or 
organizations ―affected‖ by a violation of  its terms.  A party seeking the protection 
of  the Act must prove not only that it has suffered injury due to a violation, but also 
that the violation was in ―connection with some ‗trade, commerce or consumer 
transaction.‘‖  The connection between the parties, with respect to the trade or 
commerce, cannot be ―too remote to qualify for the protections of  the Act.‖  
Remoteness is determined by ―the directness or indirectness of  the asserted injury.‖  
For example, in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., the United States Supreme 
Court denied the plaintiff ‘s recovery because the link between the alleged injury and 
the defendant‘s conduct was too remote.  Claims brought under the Act are 
governed by the same proximate cause standard applied in Holmes.  In Holmes, the 
court recognized that ―a central element of  proximate cause is the requirement of  a 
direct injury.‖  Tennessee courts have held that injuries are ―clearly indirect‖ when 
such the injuries are purely contingent on harm to third-parties.  In Tennessee Medical 
Association, the trial court ruled that TMA‘s connection to the trade between BCBST 
and its membership was too remote because TMA was ―not a party to this 
arrangement, and [TMA did] not perform services nor consume services.‖  The 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed this ruling and held that TMA‘s injuries were 
too remote to establish that BCBST‘s alleged wrongful conduct proximately caused 
TMA‘s injuries.   
 Medical associations suing on behalf  of  their memberships ―generally are 
bound by the same limitations and obligations as the members that they represent.‖  
To hold otherwise ―would permit those physicians to escape their commitments 
merely by having a representative sue on their behalf.‖  Thus, in Tennessee Medical 
Association, the trial court held that ―even if  TMA did have a derivative contract 
claim, . . . TMA‘s member physicians are required to arbitrate such claims.‖  The 
Federal Arbitration Act and case law provide that ―an arbitral forum is the preferred 
forum when parties have agreed by contract to compulsory arbitration.‖  The 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s ruling because all of  TMA‘s 
physician-providers had compulsory arbitration provisions in their contracts with 
BCBST.  The court held that the physician-providers ―cannot escape their 
commitments to arbitrate by having a representative sue on their behalf.‖  As a 
result, the claims brought by TMA against BCBST, which depended solely on the 
contractual relationship between the physician-providers and BCBST, were subject to 
the arbitration provisions of  the providers‘ contracts.   
 The Tennessee Medical Association decision demonstrates the lack of  tolerance 
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Tennessee courts have for providers‘ attempts to avoid contractual limitations by 
soliciting medical associations to bring suit on their behalf.  If  a medical association 
fails to allege a claim based on a separate contractual relationship and instead 
piggybacks its claims on a contract to which it is not a party, then it will be bound by 
any limitations set forth in the contract.  Otherwise, the value of  the contract would 
plummet, and providers could easily escape their contractual commitments to the 
detriment of  the other party.   
Courts May Not Enforce an Arbitration Agreement upon a Non-Signatory 
Party, even if  the Non-Signatory Party Is a Related Party or a Subsidiary of  a 
Signing Party.  Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 453 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2006). 
By Shelton C. Swafford 
 Although arbitration agreements may be enforced between two signatory 
parties, such agreements may not be enforced against a separate entity established by 
one of  the parties.  Even if  the separate entity was formed to benefit from the 
contractual relationship between the original two parties, the court will not bind a 
non-signatory party absent proof  of  further understanding, such as a principal-agent 
relationship.  The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. 
Alticor, Inc. 
 Alticor, Inc., Amway Corp., and Quixtar, Inc. (collectively ―Amway‖), are 
multinational companies, which sell a variety of  consumer goods.  Amway distributes 
products through a ―network marketing‖ method.  To distribute Amway products, a 
distributor must be sponsored by another distributor.  Amway encourages 
distributors to sponsor other distributors by giving awards based on how well each 
distributor and those it sponsors perform.  
Motivational tools aid the sponsoring process by encouraging current 
distributors to recruit new distributors.  Nitro Distributing, Inc. and four other 
companies (collectively ―Nitro‖) are motivational tools businesses owned by 
distributors of  Amway.  Amway prohibits its distributors from operating in the 
motivational tools business; therefore, the distributors created separate entities for 
that purpose.  While each distributor signed arbitration agreements with Amway, the 
separate entities did not.   
The separate entities brought suit against Amway in federal district court, and 
Amway sought to enforce the arbitration agreement.  The district court refused 
because the separate entities had not signed the arbitration agreements and did not 
act as agents of  the distributors who had signed the agreements.  The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court‘s decision. 
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Amway argued that the arbitration agreement should be enforced against 
Nitro on one of  three grounds:  estoppel, agency, or the ―community interest‖ 
doctrine.  First, Amway asserted that Nitro was bound by estoppel because (1) it 
received a direct benefit from Amway and (2) the affiliated distributor conducts 
business according to the Amway Rules of  Conduct.  However, the court held that 
Nitro received only an indirect benefit.  Additionally, the Amway Rules of  Conduct 
do not apply to disputes involving the separate entities.  Thus, the indirect benefit 
alone is insufficient to bind Nitro under a theory of  estoppel. 
Second, Amway argued that Nitro should be bound by the arbitration 
agreement as the distributor‘s agent.  The court disagreed holding that Amway did 
not show that Nitro had actual or apparent authority to act on behalf  of  the 
distributors.  In addition, the Amway Rules of  Conduct demanded that the 
motivation tools and product distribution businesses remain ―separate and 
unconnected activities.‖  Thus, the court refused to enforce the arbitration 
agreement against Nitro on the basis of  agency theory. 
Finally, Amway argued that Nitro should be bound by the arbitration 
agreement under the ―community of  interest‖ doctrine because Nitro‘s interests ―are 
directly related to Amway‘s interests.‖  However, the court held that the ―community 
of  interest‖ doctrine applies when a party who has not signed the arbitration 
agreement attempts to enforce the agreement against a signing party.  Because Nitro 
never signed the arbitration agreement and arbitration is solely a matter of  contract, 
Nitro cannot be bound by the agreement.  Specifically, the court refused to mandate 
arbitration when one party has not agreed to arbitrate. 
As Nitro Distributing, Inc. illustrates, it is important for a company entering 
into a business relationship with others, whether directly or indirectly, to have all 
parties sign the arbitration agreement if  it is to be enforced against them.  To do 
otherwise runs the risk of  giving the non-signing party the opportunity to avoid 
arbitration yet be able to force a signing party to arbitrate.  Nitro Distributing, Inc. did 
not settle disputes between signing parties and non-signing parties of  other types of  
documents.  However, the Nitro Distributing Court emphasized that arbitration 
agreements are ―a matter of  contract‖ and should be open for negotiation between 
both parties rather than forced upon an unwilling party.  When advising clients who 
are entering into business relationships with others, especially indirectly, transactional 
attorneys should advise their clients to have all parties involved sign the arbitration 
agreement if  the client wishes to enforce it. 
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BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Creditor Banks May Challenge Actions Taken Against Bankruptcy Property 
in Violation of  an Automatic Stay.  Ditto v. Delaware Sav. Bank, No. E2006-01439-
COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 471146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007). 
By Whitney L. Frazier 
 Section 362 of  the United States Bankruptcy Code prohibits the liquidation 
of  property of  a bankruptcy estate without prior authorization of  the bankruptcy 
court while the petition is pending.  This automatic stay protects both the debtor and 
creditors who have an interest in the debtor‘s property and continues until the 
property is no longer part of  the bankruptcy estate.  As a general rule, actions taken 
in violation of  the automatic stay are void or voidable, regardless of  whether the 
parties have knowledge of  the filed bankruptcy petition.  At issue here was whether a 
tax sale held in violation of, but without notice of, the debtor property owner‘s 
bankruptcy or the automatic stay was void or voidable.  The Tennessee Court of  
Appeals held that, on the facts before it, the sale was void.   
 In Ditto v. Delaware Savings Bank, Samevelyn Rock (―Ms. Rock‖) purchased 
real property in Hamilton County, Tennessee, in 1983 and executed a deed of  trust 
in 1997 in favor of  Delaware Savings Bank (the ―Bank‖) to secure repayment of  a 
loan.  In 1998, Ms. Rock filed a petition for relief  under Chapter 13 of  the United 
States Bankruptcy Code.  However, at that time, Ms. Rock had failed to pay her 
property taxes.  Pursuant to a court order, Ms. Rock‘s property was sold at a tax sale 
to Carlton J. Ditto (―Mr. Ditto‖) on June 7, 2001, while her bankruptcy petition was 
pending.  Neither the county clerk nor Mr. Ditto had notice of  the pending 
bankruptcy action at the time of  the tax sale.  The Chancery Court entered a decree 
confirming the sale to Mr. Ditto on June 15, 2001.  
 Controversy soon arose, and in October of  2003, Mr. Ditto sought to quiet 
title to the property he purchased at the tax sale.  The Bank answered Mr. Ditto‘s 
state court complaint by citing the validity of  its mortgage lien and claiming that the 
tax sale to Mr. Ditto was void ab initio because it violated the automatic stay in § 362 
of  the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment. 
 The trial court held that:  (1) Ms. Rock was discharged from bankruptcy on 
September 26, 2002; (2) the automatic stay does not automatically invalidate a tax 
sale; and (3) only a debtor or her trustee has standing to file an action to set aside the 
back tax sale.  On appeal, however, both parties agreed that the tax sale violated the 
automatic stay.  In Ditto, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed two issues:  (1) 
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whether the Bank had standing to challenge the tax sale of  the property to Mr. Ditto 
and (2) whether the sale to Mr. Ditto should be voided. 
 A party challenging an automatic stay violation must show that it has both 
constitutional and prudential standing.  A plaintiff  can prove constitutional standing 
by showing that it ―has suffered a personal injury as the result of  the allegedly illegal 
conduct and that the injury suffered is likely to be remedied by the relief  requested.‖  
Neither party in Ditto challenged the Bank‘s constitutional standing.  
A party may prove prudential standing by showing that it is a ―proper party‖ 
to seek resolution in the dispute at hand.  To determine whether a party has 
prudential standing, a court must ask:  ―(1) whether the complaint raises abstract 
questions or a generalized grievance more properly addressed by the legislative 
branch; (2) whether the plaintiff  is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests 
rather than the legal rights and interests of  third parties; and (3) whether a plaintiff ‘s 
grievance arguably falls within the zone of  interests protected by the statutory 
provision invoked in the suit.‖   
Mr. Ditto argued that because the Bank neither owned the property during 
the sale nor served as the bankruptcy trustee, the Bank did not meet the third prong 
of  the test and did not have prudential standing.  The Bank responded by citing § 
362 of  the Bankruptcy Code, and asserting that the automatic stay protects the 
interests of  both creditors and debtors.  This section gives the debtor a ―breathing 
spell,‖ permitting the debtor ―to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or 
simply to be relieved of  the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.‖  
The automatic stay also provides protection to creditors as parties with a ―pecuniary 
interest adversely affected by a post-petition transfer of  property.‖   
Rather than perpetuating a chaotic race to the courthouse, ―[b]ankruptcy is 
designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are 
treated equally.‖  If  the automatic stay did not protect their interests, creditors would 
be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor‘s property.   Thus, the court 
held that the Bank did have constitutional and prudential standing to challenge the 
tax sale.  
Next, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed whether the tax sale to Mr. 
Ditto should be declared void or voidable.  ―Void‖ denotes that the transaction ―is 
nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it,‖ or as having ―no legal force or 
effect and so incapable of  confirmation or ratification.‖  ―Voidable‖ means ―not 
void in itself,‖ but ―capable of  being adjudged void, invalid, and of  no force.‖  While 
the court has recognized some equitable exceptions to the automatic stay, it 
nonetheless has held actions taken in violation of  the stay completely void, absent 
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some equitable circumstance that would render them are voidable.  The court 
previously suggested in Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp., 990 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1993), 
―that only where the debtor unreasonably withholds notice of  the stay and the 
creditor would be prejudiced if  the debtor is able to raise the stay as a defense, or 
where the debtor is attempting to use the stay unfairly as a shield to avoid an 
unfavorable result will the protection of  the automatic stay be unavailable to the 
debtor.‖  Since no such equitable circumstance existed in the present case, the court 
declared the sale to Mr. Ditto void for violating the automatic stay.  Thus, the tax sale 
had no effect, and the property interests of  the parties remained the same as they 
were prior to the sale. 
The decision in Ditto v. Delaware Savings Bank illustrates that § 362 of  the 
Bankruptcy Code protects more than just the interests of  the party who files the 
petition.  Rather, both creditors and debtors with valid interests have standing to 
challenge transfers of  property of  the bankruptcy estate made in violation of  the 
automatic stay.  Transactional lawyers should advise their clients that any entity with 
an interest in such property might challenge such a transaction, even if  the sale was 
pursuant to court order.  Attorneys should also discourage clients from purchasing 
property without conducting diligent research to determine if  a bankruptcy petition 
has been filed by one holding property rights in the property, as notice of  the 
bankruptcy petition is not necessary for the automatic stay to take effect.  
 
Good Faith Required to Preserve Debtor’s Right to Conversion.  Marrama v. 
Citizens Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1105 (2007). 
By Stephen D. Hargraves 
Although federal courts virtually unanimously agree that prepetition bad-
faith conduct may cause a forfeiture of  any right to proceed at the outset of  a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, some courts have held that a bad-faith debtor has an 
absolute right to convert at least one Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case.  In 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of  
whether the United States Bankruptcy Code (―the Code‖) requires such a conversion 
even though the case may subsequently be dismissed or immediately returned to 
Chapter 7. 
Robert Marrama (―Marrama‖) initially filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition 
under Chapter 7 of  the Code.  In verified schedules attached to his petition, 
Marrama asserted numerous misleading or inaccurate statements, including 
statements regarding his principal asset, a house in Maine.  Marrama stated that the 
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revocable trust that owned the Maine property had zero value and that he had not 
transferred any property during the year preceding the petition‘s filing other than in 
the ordinary course of  business.  However, the Maine property carried substantial 
value, and Marrama had transferred the property into the revocable trust without 
consideration within the preceding year.  The Chapter 7 estate trustee subsequently 
confirmed that Marrama‘s transfer of  the Maine property was an effort to protect 
the property from Marrama‘s creditors.  In addition, Marrama claimed a homestead 
exemption for property in Gloucester, Massachusetts, even though Marrama did not 
reside at the property but received rental income from it.  
After discovering the misleading and inaccurate statements, Marrama‘s 
Chapter 7 estate trustee conveyed to Marrama the trustee‘s intention to recover the 
Maine property as an asset of  the estate.  Upon learning of  the trustee‘s intention, 
Marrama filed a motion to convert the Chapter 7 petition to a Chapter 13 petition.  
Thereafter, the bankruptcy judge determined that Marrama acted in ―bad faith‖ and 
denied the request for conversion.  
On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (―BAP‖) interpreted Section 
706(a) of  the Code as creating a right to convert a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 
13 that ―is absolute only in the absence of  extreme circumstances.‖  The BAP 
determined that Marrama‘s failure to disclose the transfer of  the Maine property to a 
trust, as well as his attempt to claim an exemption on rental property, constituted 
such extreme circumstances.  As a result, the BAP affirmed the denial of  the 
conversion.  On appeal, the Court of  Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the two 
previous decisions.  The court noted that given its authority to dismiss a Chapter 13 
petition for ―bad faith‖ by the debtor (as implicitly authorized in Section 1307(c)), it 
should not treat an attempt to convert a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13 differently 
than if  the debtor initially filed a Chapter 13 petition. 
The United States Supreme Court noted that subsections (a) and (d) of  
Section 706 of  the Code are the most relevant in determining whether a debtor has 
an absolute right of  conversion.  Subsection (a) states that ―[t]he debtor may convert 
a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of  this title at any 
time, if  the case has not [already] been converted . . . .  Any waiver of  the right to 
convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable.‖  In addition, subsection (d) 
states that ―[n]otwithstanding any other provision of  this section, a case may not be 
converted to a case under another chapter of  this title unless the debtor may be a 
debtor under such chapter.‖  
 Marrama contended in his appeal that subsection (a) created an absolute right 
of  conversion that could not be forfeited.  The language in the related Senate Report 
that a debtor has a one-time absolute right of  conversion of  a liquidation case 
2007]                                         CASE COMMENTARIES                       257 
 
(Chapter 7) to a reorganization or individual repayment plan case (Chapter 13) 
appeared to support Marrama‘s position.  Furthermore, the Senate Report confirmed 
that a waiver of  the right to convert a case is unenforceable.  However, the Court 
dismissed Marrama‘s argument that the unenforceable waiver provision in the Code 
works as a shield against forfeiture.  In dismissing the argument, the Court noted that 
the unenforceability provision merely functions as a consumer protection provision 
against adhesion contracts.  In the instant case, the record did not show any evidence 
of  adhesion contracts between Marrama and his creditors that required a waiver of  
Marrama‘s right to conversion.  As to the one-time absolute right of  conversion, the 
Court noted that when read in conjunction with subsection (d), the words ―unless 
the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter‖ expressly conditioned Marrama‘s 
right to convert on his ability to qualify as a ―debtor‖ under Chapter 13. 
 Although multiple reasons why Marrama may not qualify as a debtor under 
Chapter 13 exist, the Court focused its analysis on Section 1307(c) of  the Code.  
Subsection (c) provides that a Chapter 13 proceeding may be either dismissed or 
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding ―for cause‖ and includes a nonexclusive list of  
ten (10) causes justifying such relief.  Although none of  the listed causes identifies 
prepetition bad-faith conduct, the majority of  bankruptcy courts treat dismissal or 
conversion of  Chapter 13 cases for prepetition bad-faith conduct as implicitly 
authorized by the words ―for cause.‖  Therefore, in the instant case, Marrama‘s 
prepetition bad-faith conduct during his earlier Chapter 7 proceeding precluded him 
from qualifying as a debtor under Chapter 13.  As a result, Marrama was not deemed 
a member of  the class of  ―honest but unfortunate debtors‖ that the Code intended 
to protect.  The Court found that the conditional language in Section 706(d) 
provided authority for the denial of  Marrama‘s motion to convert.  Consequently, 
the Court affirmed the lower court‘s decision. 
Although the federal courts have nearly unanimously held that prepetition 
bad-faith conduct may cause a forfeiture of  any right to proceed at the outset of  a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the Court‘s holding in Marrama resolved that a debtor 
does not have an absolute right to convert his bankruptcy case from Chapter 7 to 
Chapter 13.  A transactional lawyer should advise his clients to diligently provide all 
necessary disclosures so that the lawyer may accurately prepare the schedules 
accompanying the client‘s Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  Failure to accurately 
portray the client‘s financial position may be viewed as prepetition bad-faith, and, 
consistent with the holding in Marrama, result in the client‘s removal from the class 
of  ―honest but unfortunate debtors‖ who enjoy the right to convert their cases from 
Chapter 7 to Chapter 13.  A loss of  this right would mean that the client would lose 
the opportunity to repay his debts while retaining possession of  his assets. 
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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Duty of  Good Faith Strictly Enforced When Expelling Members from an 
LLC. Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2006-02647-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
582 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2007) (Anderson II).  
By Burke Keaty 
 Recently, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals upheld a jury‘s decision to award 
damages to former minority members of  a Tennessee member-managed limited 
liability company who sued majority members alleging that the majority members 
violated their fiduciary duties and obligation of  good faith in voting to expel the 
minority members from the firm.  Although there was an operating agreement that 
authorized the expulsion of  the minority members, Anderson v. Wilder makes it clear 
that the majority‘s actions must be taken in a manner consistent with their fiduciary 
duties and obligation of  good faith.  Contractual language in an operating agreement 
does not shield the majority from breaches of  fiduciary and good faith 
responsibilities.  
 The court‘s opinion includes a procedural history of  the case and a lengthy 
review of  the testimony and evidence offered at trial before addressing the issues 
raised on appeal.  After the Plaintiffs filed suit, the ―Defendants moved for summary 
judgment arguing that their actions were expressly permitted under the operating 
agreement, and that they acted in good faith in expelling the Plaintiffs.‖  The 
operating agreement provided that ―the Company may expel a Member, with or 
without cause, from the Company upon a vote or written consent of  the Members 
who hold a majority of  Units.‖  The trial court initially agreed with the Defendants 
and granted their motion for summary judgment; however, the appellate court did 
not and vacated the trial court‘s order.  In Anderson I, decided in 2003, the appellate 
court held that a ―majority shareholder of  an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship 
to the minority . . . [and] [s]uch a holding does not conflict with the statute, and is in 
keeping with the statutory requirement that each LLC member discharge all of  his or 
her duties in good faith.‖  The court held that a genuine issue of  material fact existed 
as to:  
[W]hether the defendants‘ actions in expelling the minority Plaintiffs 
were taken in good faith, as required by the LLC Act, or whether they 
expelled Plaintiffs solely in order to force the acquisition of  their 
membership units at a price of  $150.00 in order to sell them at 
$250.00 per unit, in violation of  their fiduciary duty.   
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Upon its decision, the appellate court remanded the case for trial.  However, at trial 
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and the trial court declared a 
mistrial.  The case proceeded to trial a second time, and the jury found in favor of  
the plaintiffs, awarding damages and pre-judgment interest totaling $98,895.36.  The 
Defendants appealed the result of  the second trial in Anderson II.  
 Plaintiffs were current and former members of  FuturePoint Administrative 
Services, LLC (―FuturePoint‖), a Tennessee member-managed limited liability 
company in the business of  administering third-party medical claims.  Upon creation 
of  the firm, the members executed an operating agreement dividing equity interests 
in the firm into ―ownership units‖ and providing for a management committee to 
oversee and manage the firm‘s business operations.  Specifically, the management 
committee was responsible for controlling the funds in the firm‘s operating account.  
There were a total of  eleven members, and each member paid $150.00 per 
ownership unit, with the exception of  defendant Brett Wilder and his wife, who were 
allocated a 20% ownership interest in the company without contributing any money 
capital.  The operating agreement provided that the firm could expel any member, 
with or without cause, upon a vote or written consent of  the members who held a 
majority of  units.  In such cases, the remaining members were obligated to purchase 
the expelled member‘s ownership units at $150 per unit.   
 The dispute giving rise to this case began at a FuturePoint members‘ meeting 
that took place on September 10, 2001.  The members discussed offers from outside 
investors interested in purchasing ownership units for $250 per unit.  The members 
were divided as to whether they should accept any offer, primarily because they 
disagreed about what would happen to the money in the company‘s operating 
account if  an offer were accepted.  Some members argued that those who decided to 
sell their shares should be entitled to their share of  the firm‘s profits.  These 
members reasoned, using law and the terms of  the operating agreement, that the 
profits should be distributed prior to a new investor entering the company.  Other 
members contended that the company should not distribute its profit because the 
price per unit offered by the outside investors would decrease.   
The company had accumulated $63,000 in its operating account as profit, 
and it was the management committee‘s responsibility to determine whether to make 
distributions.  In concluding the September 10th meeting, the members decided not 
to accept any offer and instead to wait until the upcoming management committee 
meeting when they would know whether the $63,000 would be distributed.  The 
management committee meeting was scheduled to take place the following day; 
however, due to the September 11 attacks, the meeting was rescheduled for 
September 14, 2001. 
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The management committee consisted of  Plaintiffs Michael Atkins, Charles 
Quade, and Bill Thompson and Defendants Lamarr Stout and Brett Wilder.  
According to the testimony at trial, the three Plaintiffs on the committee favored 
distributing the money in the operating account, while the two Defendants disagreed.  
Knowing they were outnumbered three to two, the Defendants acted before the 
meeting could take place.  Defendant Wilder contacted his accountant, who put 
Wilder in touch with a lawyer, Lewis Howard, Jr.  Wilder testified that he was told 
that he and the other members who felt the money in the operating account should 
not be distributed should disband the operating agreement and expel the members 
who disagreed.  Howard testified that he reviewed the operating agreement, 
specifically the provision dealing with the expulsion of  members, and determined 
that a majority vote of  the members can expel members from the company.  
Furthermore, he testified that ―Mr. Wilder‘s group constituted a majority of  the 
membership interest of  the company, and therefore under the operating agreement, 
they had the ability to vote to expel members, and I advised them that they could do 
that under this agreement.‖  
The Plaintiffs alleged that Wilder led a majority of  shareholders to act against 
those who wanted to disburse the $63,000 by taking advantage of  the operating 
agreement‘s provision regarding the expulsion of  members.  According to a 
document entitled ―Actions taken by written consent of  the members of  
FuturePoint Administrative Services, LLC,‖ the Defendants, holding a majority of  
units: (1) expelled the Plaintiffs; (2) deleted the article in the operating agreement 
creating the management committee and reassigned its functions to defendant 
Wilder; and (3) replaced plaintiff  Quade with defendant Stout as secretary of  the 
firm.  The remaining members of  the firm purchased the expelled members‘ 
ownership units at $150 per unit as provided in the operating agreement.   
Less than one month later, the Defendants sold a total of  499 membership 
units to an investor for $250 per unit.  The Plaintiffs, consisting of  six expelled 
members who held a 47% ownership interest in the firm before their expulsion, filed 
suit against the Defendants, Wilder and four others who collectively held the 
remaining 53% ownership interest before the expulsion.  The suit alleged that the 
Defendants violated their fiduciary duties and obligations of  good faith and fair 
dealing as members in exercising the authority granted in the expulsion provision of  
the operating agreement.  At trial, the jury agreed and found that the Defendants 
violated their fiduciary duties and their obligation of  good faith by not allowing the 
Plaintiffs the opportunity to sell their shares at a profit. 
 On appeal, the Defendants argued that they were entitled to a new trial 
because the trial court erred in (1) denying their motions for a directed verdict, (2) 
awarding pre-judgment interest, and (3) charging the jury.  First, the appellate court 
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found that the jury was presented with sufficient material evidence to support its 
verdict; thus, the trial court did not error in denying the Defendants‘ motions for a 
directed verdict.  The appellate court stated that the ―Defendants‘ arguments in 
regard to this issue are, in essence, a reflection of  Defendants‘ continuing belief  that 
our opinion in Anderson I was wrong . . .  [and] no fiduciary duty is owed between 
members of  a member-managed LLC.‖  The appellate court held that because the 
Defendants did not appeal Anderson I, it was ―the law of  the case,‖ and therefore, a 
majority member of  a member-managed LLC has a fiduciary duty to a minority 
member.  The appellate court affirmed the jury‘s decision holding the defendants 
liable for breaching their fiduciary duties. 
Second, the appellate court noted that ―an award of  prejudgment interest is 
within the sound discretion of  the trial court and the decision will not be disturbed 
by an appellate court unless the record reveals a manifest and palpable abuse of  
discretion.‖  Finding no abuse of  discretion, the trial court‘s decision to award 
prejudgment interest was affirmed. 
Third, the Defendants argued that the trial court erred in charging the jury in 
two respects.  First, the Defendants argued that the court read too much of  a statute 
to the jury as part of  its charging.  However, the appellate court found no error in 
the trial court‘s decision.  Second, the Defendants argued that the trial court erred by 
refusing to give their proposed jury instruction to the jury.  However, the appellate 
court found that the proposed jury instruction was ―simply an attempt to circumvent 
[the appellate court‘s] clear ruling in Anderson I.‖  Thus, the trial court‘s refusal to give 
the proposed jury instruction was proper.  
 Anderson v. Wilder serves as a serious warning to attorneys who give advice to 
members of  Tennessee member-managed limited liability companies.  Even though 
the authority to expel members was properly granted and clearly stated in 
FuturePoint‘s operating agreement, the court found that the members who acted 
under such authority violated their fiduciary duties to the other members of  the 
firm.  In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on Anderson I, which held 
that ―a majority shareholder of  an LLC owes a fiduciary obligation to a minority 
shareholder‖ and ―each LLC member is required to discharge his or her duties in 
good faith.‖  Thus, there currently is a conflict between authority granted in an 
operating agreement and mandatory fiduciary duties.  Until the court either resolves 
this conflict or clarifies the boundaries of  its holding in Anderson II, transactional 
attorneys should practice with the knowledge that the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
adamantly enforces mandatory fiduciary duties.  Transactional attorneys should 
advise their clients that actions taken in accordance with the provisions of  an 
operating agreement must be consistent with the actor‘s fiduciary duties and 
obligations of  good faith and fair dealing.  Further, actions taken in accordance with 
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the provisions of  the operating agreement must be consistent with the actor‘s 
fiduciary duties and obligations of  good faith and fair dealing. 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW 
Active and Personal Involvement:  The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine and 
Personal Jurisdiction.  Innovative Eng'g & Consulting Corp. v. Hurley & Assoc., Inc., No. 
1:05CV0764, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70502 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2006). 
By Aaron J. Kandel 
 An officer of  a corporation who is actively and personally involved in the 
corporation‘s transactions in another state may be liable in their individual capacity, 
not just as an agent of  the corporation.  Although the fiduciary shield doctrine 
prevents the forum state from exercising personal jurisdiction over an officer whose 
contacts with the state were made in his official capacity, the Sixth Circuit recently 
overruled, or at least severely limited, the doctrine‘s application.  This is especially 
relevant when the officer has conducted multiple transactions in the forum state and 
has claimed to have an interest in intellectual property that was designed and 
manufactured in that state.  Such was the situation presented to the District Court 
for the Northern District of  Ohio in Innovative Engineering & Consulting Corp. v. Hurley 
& Assoc., Inc. 
 Innovative Engineering & Consulting Corp. (―IEC‖), an Ohio corporation 
with its principal place of  business in Cleveland, Ohio, and Hurley & Associates, Inc. 
(―H&A‖), a Maryland corporation with its principal place of  business in Mt. Airy, 
Maryland, had a preexisting business relationship.  IEC designed and manufactured 
the custom components for use in H&A‘s surveillance systems.  In early 2004 and 
late 2005 the parties entered into another series of  contracts for the purchase of  
custom components.  IEC performed all of  its obligations under the contracts by 
manufacturing the requested components and preparing them for delivery.  
However, in early 2005, H&A refused to accept delivery of, or pay for the 
components. 
 IEC filed suit asserting multiple claims against H&A and against Thomas 
Hurley (―Hurley‖), the owner and officer of  H&A.  Specifically, IEC asserted the 
following claims against Hurley: (1) false designation of  origin, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(A); (2) false advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (3) unfair 
competition; and (4) sought declaratory judgment as to whether Hurley is a co-
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inventor under patent law.  Subsequently, Hurley filed a motion to dismiss the counts 
asserting that he entered into the IEC contracts in his capacity as an officer of  H&A 
and thus the fiduciary shield doctrine prevents the court from exercising personal 
jurisdiction over him. 
 Because IEC‘s declaratory judgment action arose under federal patent law, 
the court applied the law of  the Federal Circuit to determine whether the court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Hurley.  Under federal circuit law, a court must 
first determine whether a provision of  the state‘s long-arm statute makes the 
defendant amenable to process.  Second, the court must ensure that maintenance of  
the suit does not offend traditional notions of  fair play and substantial justice under 
federal due process. 
 The Ohio long-arm statute confers jurisdiction if  the defendant regularly 
does or solicits business in Ohio, engages in any other persistent course of  conduct, 
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in the state.  
Conversely, the fiduciary shield doctrine prevents a court from exercising personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with the state were made solely in his 
official capacity as an officer of  a corporation.  However, the Sixth Circuit recently 
held that the fiduciary shield doctrine does not prevent a court from exercising 
personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state officer was actively and personally 
involved in the conduct that gave rise to the claim.  In those situations, traditional 
notions of  fair play and substantial justice govern the exercise of  personal 
jurisdiction. 
 Thus, the court‘s inquiry focused on the specifics and nature of  Hurley‘s 
contacts with the forum state.  The court found that (1) Hurley conducted 
approximately 625 transactions with IEC that resulted in over 2.3 million dollars of  
business; (2) Hurley had provided $20,000 in software development funds to IEC; 
(3) Hurley claimed to have an interest in intellectual property that was designed, 
developed, and manufactured in Ohio; and (4) Hurley made numerous phone calls 
and sent several written demands into Ohio.   Based on those findings, the court 
concluded that Hurley was actively and personally involved in ―all aspects of  the 
business relationship‖ with IEC.   
 Next, the court applied the standard three-part inquiry under federal due 
process to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction existed.  First, the court 
found that Hurley had purposefully directed his business activities at residents of  
Ohio.  Second, the court found that IEC‘s claims ―arise out of  and relate to‖ its 
contacts with Hurley.  Third, the court found that the exercise of  jurisdiction over 
Hurley was fair and reasonable.  Therefore, the court concluded that it could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over Hurley and denied his Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. 
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 As Innovative Engineering & Consulting Corp. v. Hurley & Assoc., Inc. illustrates, 
the fiduciary shield doctrine has been severely limited in some jurisdictions.  
However, even in those jurisdictions, a court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction in 
a manner that offends due process.  Thus, a transactional attorney in a limited 
application jurisdiction should advise his clients that their actions as an officer of  a 
corporation may subject them to personal liability.  The risks of  personal liability, 
however, cannot be quantifiable. 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
An Aggrieved Purchaser May Not Seek Revocation of  Acceptance Against the 
Distributor or Manufacturer of  a Product.  Watts v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 
E2007-00311-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). 
By Whitney L. Quarles 
 Most automobile purchasers expect to retain a right to revoke acceptance if  
he or she discovers that the newly-purchased automobile is a ―lemon.‖  However, 
such rights of  revocation are limited.  In Watts v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, the 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed the issue of  whether the purchaser of  a new 
automobile may seek revocation of  acceptance against the automobile distributor.  
The court held that ―the remedy of  revocation of  acceptance . . . is only available 
against the seller, not the distributor, of  the product.‖   
 In 2001, Robert L. Watts purchased a new 2002 model Mercedes-Benz 
automobile from a dealer in Knoxville, Tennessee.  The automobile was supplied to 
the dealership by Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (―MBUSA‖).  MBUSA provided a 
limited written warranty agreeing to cover repair costs or replacement caused by 
defects in materials or workmanship for a period of  4 years or 50,000 miles.   
Three years later, while the automobile was still covered by MBUSA‘s 
warranty, Mr. Watts brought suit against MBUSA.  His suit cited the automobile‘s 
inoperability for 54 days and alleged breaches of  express warranty and the implied 
warranties of  merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.  He further alleged 
a violation of  the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (―the Act‖).  The trial court granted 
MBUSA‘s motion for summary judgment as to each claim except the breach of  
express written warranty.  After trial, Mr. Watts dismissed his request for monetary 
damages, leaving only his request for revocation of  acceptance under Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 47-2-608 and the Act. 
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The Tennessee Court of  Appeals began its opinion by noting that ―the UCC 
remedy of  revocation of  acceptance, ‗for all practical effect replaces the old equitable 
doctrine of  rescission.‘‖  The court then explained that both Tennessee statutes and 
―common-sense‖ dictate that an aggrieved purchaser has no right of  revocation of  
acceptance against the distributor of  a product.  The court used a textualist approach 
to reach its conclusion; it stated that Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-608, which provides 
for revocation of  acceptance, ―exclusively uses the terms ‗buyer‘ and ‗seller.‘‖  This 
language suggested to the court that ―a buyer-seller relationship is required for 
revocation of  acceptable to be available.‖  Thus, because ―sale‖ is defined under 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-103(1)(d) as ―the passing of  title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price[,]‖ the remedy of  revocation of  acceptance is unavailable in a buyer-
distributor relationship when title has not passed and privity does not exist.  This 
reasoning applies equally to bar revocation of  acceptance against a manufacturer.  
Instead, privity of  contract between a buyer and seller is required to allow a 
revocation of  acceptance.   
The court rejected Watts‘ argument that the distributor‘s warranty, which was 
part of  the consideration for the purchase price, created privity between the seller 
and the distributor.  The court acknowledged that an aggrieved buyer is not without 
a remedy against a distributor who breaches an express warranty; however that 
remedy is limited to monetary damages.  The court found no merit in a claim for 
revocation against a distributor because the buyer accepted the product from and 
paid the purchase price to the seller.   
Furthermore, the court rejected Watts‘ claim under the Act, which provides 
that ―a consumer who is damaged by the failure of  a supplier, warrantor, or service 
contractor to comply with . . . a written warranty, implied warranty, or service 
contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.‖  The court 
stated that, according to the Act‘s language, state law determines the available 
remedies.  In Long v. Monaco Coach Corp., No. 3:04-CV-203, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
62808 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2006), the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of  Tennessee, applying Tennessee law, ―found that revocation of  acceptance 
was not available under the Magnuson-Moss Act.‖   
Although the Watts Court denied a revocation of  acceptance against the 
distributor, it noted that Mr. Watts may pursue other remedies.  He may potentially 
seek monetary damages from the distributor or a revocation of  acceptance against 
the seller.   
Watts v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC represents a decision favorable to 
distributors and manufacturers.  Because purchasers are not in privity with 
distributors or manufacturers as to constitute a ―buyer-seller‖ relationship, a court 
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may not award a revocation of  acceptance to an aggrieved purchaser against them.  
In dispensing with this remedy, the court enumerated a ―purchaser‘s only‖ remedy 
against a distributor or a manufacturer – the ability to seek monetary damages.  
Although distributors and manufacturers are not relieved from all liability for a 
breach of  express warranty, a monetary damage award is likely to be far less than the 
purchase price of  a new automobile.  Thus, the court‘s holding effectively limits the 
liability of  a distributor and a manufacturer to money damages for breach of  
warranty.  
 
You Say Mobile; I Say Modular.  When the Restrictive Covenant for a 
Tennessee Subdivision Does Not Expressly Prohibit “Modular Homes,” the 
Covenant’s Specific Prohibitions Against “Mobile Homes” and “Trailers” 
Cannot Be Expanded to Include This Distinct Type of  Housing.  Williams v. 
Fox, 219 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. 2007). 
By Bradley J. Hearne 
In Williams v. Fox, the Supreme Court of  Tennessee considered the issue of  
whether a subdivision‘s restrictive covenant that specifically prohibits ―mobile 
homes‖ and ―trailers‖ includes a restriction on ―modular homes.‖  The court held 
that modular homes are distinct types of  structures from mobile homes and trailers 
and when the restrictive covenant at issue does not expressly prohibit modular 
homes, the plain language of  the covenant cannot be expanded to prohibit them. 
The plaintiffs and defendant each owned lots in a residential subdivision.  
The restrictive covenants for this development specifically prohibited the 
construction or placement of  ―temporary buildings of  any kind including mobile 
homes . . . or trailers‖ on any lot.  The covenant, however, was silent as to modular 
homes and did not provide a definition of  mobile homes or trailers.  After the 
defendant had a modular home delivered to his lot and began to assemble it, the 
plaintiffs, citing the subdivision‘s restriction against mobile homes, obtained a 
permanent injunction ordering the defendant to remove the partially constructed 
structure from his property. 
 Under the Tennessee Motor Vehicle and Title Registration Law 
(―TMVTRL‖), mobile homes and house trailers are given the same definition.  In 
part, mobile homes and house trailers are defined as ―any vehicle or conveyance, not 
self-propelled, designed for use as a residence.‖  The definition also includes any 
―manufactured home,‖ which is described, in part, by the TMVTRL as being ―built 
on a permanent chassis.‖  Finally, under the TMVTRL, mobile homes and house 
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trailers are required to be titled as motor vehicles.  In Williams, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court noted that these provisions ―illustrate the temporary and mobile 
nature of  these structures.‖   
 In 1985, Tennessee enacted the Tennessee Modular Building Act (―TMBA‖), 
which defined modular homes as something distinct from mobile homes or trailers 
and recognized the need to establish new inspection procedures to encourage the 
construction of  affordable housing.  Notably, the Act describes ―modular building 
units‖ as ―not designed for ready removal to another site.‖  In Williams, the trial 
court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the structure delivered to the 
defendant‘s lot was a modular home. 
 The court relied on these statutory distinctions and concluded that modular 
homes are distinct structures from mobile homes and trailers.  Mobile homes and 
trailers are built on permanent chassis and are, by nature, temporary and mobile.  On 
the other hand, modular homes are not built on permanent chassis and are not easily 
moved to another location after installation.  Additionally, whereas mobile homes 
and house trailers are required to be titled as motor vehicles, modular homes are not. 
As further evidence of  a recognized distinction, the court noted that other 
subdivision covenants in the area already recognized and addressed the distinction 
between modular homes, mobile homes, and trailers by specifically referring to each 
by name in the text of  the restrictions.  Each of  the nearby covenants to which the 
court referred were recorded prior to the covenant at issue but after the enactment 
of  the TMBA.  The covenant at issue was recorded in 1995, some 10 years after the 
TMBA defined and regulated modular homes as something distinct from mobile 
homes and trailers.  
 The court also resolved the discrepancy between some established rules of  
construction and the prior interpretation of  restrictive covenants by Tennessee 
courts.  ―As a general rule, restrictive covenants are not favored in Tennessee because 
they are in derogation of  the right of  free use and enjoyment of  property.‖  As a 
result, these covenants are typically strictly construed and ambiguities are resolved 
―in a manner which advances the unrestricted use of  the property.‖  However, in 
prior cases, Tennessee courts have tended to broadly construe restrictions against 
mobile homes and trailers, reasoning that such construction is in line ―with the desire 
of  developers to prevent property owners from placing residential units that were 
constructed off-site onto subdivision lots.‖  The court resolved this discrepancy by 
noting that Williams was the first case in which the structure at issue was a modular 
home.  In each of  these prior cases, the structure at issue was a mobile home ―built 
on permanent chassis and titled and registered pursuant to the [TMVTRL].‖  Based 
on the distinct characteristics of  modular homes recognized by the legislature and 
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the drafters of  restrictive covenants for nearby subdivisions and because the 
covenant at issue did not expressly prohibit modular homes, the court held that the 
plain wording of  the covenant could not be expanded to prohibit the defendant‘s 
modular home. 
 The significance of  the Williams decision to practicing attorneys is clear.  If  a 
client wants a restrictive covenant to prohibit modular homes, the drafter of  the 
restrictions must specifically refer to modular homes and not just mobile homes 
and/or trailers.  It may be wise to define exactly what constitutes the prohibited 
structure in the restrictions as well to avoid the risk of  courts looking outside the 
document to statutory definitions and other covenants to determine the meaning of  
such terms.  Williams reinforces the rule of  strict construction of  restrictive 
covenants, which promotes the free use and enjoyment of  property.  At the same 
time, it provides sufficient flexibility for drafters of  restrictive covenants to retain 
mastery over their terms.  Advocates of  clearly defined property rights should 
rejoice! 
 
Contract Modification Requires Mutual Assent Supported by Consideration; 
Waiver and Estoppel Acknowledge a Party’s Legal Right, But Assert That 
Some Conduct by the Party Precludes It from Exercising Its Right.  E & A 
Ne. Ltd. P’ship v. Music City Record Distrib., Inc. No. M2005-01207-COA-R3-CV, 2007 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007). 
By Rachel E. Levinson 
 Before a contract can be modified, it is said that the party seeking to modify 
the contract and the responding party must have a ―meeting of  the minds.‖  If  no 
meeting of  the minds occurs, then the responding party is entitled to the benefit of  
the bargain it originally reached.  The bottom line is that there must be bargained for 
consideration on both sides of  the modified claim for it to be legally enforceable.  
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed this type of  situation in E&A Northeast 
Ltd. P’ship v. Music City Record Distributors, Inc. 
 Music City Record Distributors (―Music City‖) and E&A Northeast 
Partnership (―E&A‖) entered into a written agreement, entitled ―License Agreement 
for the Use of  Vacant Space‖ on March 1, 2001 (the ―Agreement‖).  This 
Agreement, provided that Music City would pay a monthly rent of  $4,445 for retail 
store space.  Condition ten of  the Agreement allowed either party to terminate the 
agreement by giving 60 days written notice to the other party. 
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 In the summer of  2002, Music City requested a reduction in the rental rate.  
E&A showed no inclination that it would agree to this request.  Music City then sent 
a letter to E&A regarding E&A‘s failure to respond and stated that Music City would 
begin paying a reduced rental amount on May 1, 2003.  The letter further stated that 
no response from E&A would indicate E&A‘s agreement to the reduction.  If, 
however, E&A did not agree to the reduction, the letter provided that E&A should 
send notice for Music City to vacate by June 30, 2003.  
 E&A did not send any written communication to Music City regarding this 
request.  Subsequently, Music City began paying the reduced rate.  During the next 
several months, correspondence between the parties included E&A‘s request for the 
full amount of  rent and Music City‘s refusal to pay it.  On November 7, 2003, E&A‘s 
counsel sent a letter to Music City indicating that Music City had materially breached 
the contract by failing to pay $11,145 in back rent.  Music City did not remit the 
requested funds.  Instead, Music City sent a letter of  termination pursuant to 
condition ten of  the agreement, indicating it would vacate the premises and 
terminate the agreement on January 15, 2004.  E&A accepted this lease termination 
and sent a certified letter to Music City requesting immediate payment of  the full 
amount due under their rental agreement, now over $14,000.  Music City did not pay. 
 On February 18, 2004, E&A filed suit in the Chancery Court of  Davidson 
County for the unpaid rent.  Music City denied owing any money and argued that 
E&A had waived enforcement of  the original agreement and that E&A‘s actions 
estopped Music City from denying that it had accepted the new agreement.  Both 
parties moved for summary judgment.  The court ruled that the parties had not 
modified their agreement because no ―meeting of  minds‖ occurred.  Further, even if  
E&A‘s actions could be deemed an implied consent to a rental reduction, Music 
City‘s defenses still failed for lack of  consideration.  The chancery court awarded the 
full amount of  the rent deficiency to E&A.   
 On appeal, Music City raised several issues.  First, Music City questioned 
whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Agreement had not been modified.  
Music City requested E&A to either modify the existing agreement or send a notice 
to vacate; however, E&A chose to reject either alternative.  According to the 
precedent set in Thompson v. Creswell Indus. Supply, Inc., the burden rests on the 
defendant to demonstrate that an existing contract has been modified by mutual 
assent.  While Music City attempted to construe inaction by E&A as acceptance of  
the contract modification, Tennessee contract law does not give Music City that 
power.  A party has no duty to respond to an unsolicited offer; only an overt action 
can result in acceptance of  an offer.  The court of  appeals held that E&A‘s 
acceptance of  the rental checks for the reduced amount did not satisfy this burden.  
The court also addressed the requirement that a contract modification be supported 
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by consideration.  The trial court ruled that merely sending a letter that provided no 
benefit for E&A‘s bargain did not constitute consideration.  Music City contended 
that it proffered some consideration by not terminating the lease, which it had 
discretion to do.  The appellate court held that because E&A never agreed, either 
explicitly or impliedly, to such a reduction, Music City was barred from prevailing.   
 Additionally, Music City also argued that waiver and estoppel prevented E&A 
from collecting the unpaid rent.  Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of  a known 
right.  Music City argued that E&A‘s failure to promptly respond to its request and its 
subsequent acceptance of  checks for a reduced amount represented E&A‘s intention 
to waive its right to receive the full rental amount.  However, the court of  appeals 
held that E&A was under no legal duty to respond to the letter.  Moreover, since 
E&A consistently expressed its intention to hold Music City to the original terms of  
the contract, it did not voluntarily relinquish its right to accept full payment by 
merely accepting the partial payments.    
On the other hand, estoppel recognizes that a party could be stripped of  its 
legal right by any conduct that the other party relied on to its detriment.  In this 
regard, Music City argued that because it relied on E&A‘s failure to respond to their 
request in a timely manner in determining not to terminate the lease, E&A should be 
estopped from asserting its right to the original rental amount.  The court of  appeals 
disagreed; it was not reasonable for Music City to rely on a failure of  E&A to 
respond in a timely manner when Music City was the party who determined the 
timeframe upon which the failure to act was based.  Thus, the court of  appeals 
affirmed the trial court‘s decision to award E&A the full rental amount.  
As E&A illustrates, contract modification requires mutual assent and be 
supported by consideration on the part of  each party.  A meeting of  the minds must 
occur to enact any amendments to key terms of  a contract.  E&A did not agree to 
the modification that Music City proposed.  Moreover, there was no evidence of  
consideration on the part of  Music City.  If  Music City had attempted to renegotiate 
the terms of  the Agreement by offering some benefit to E&A to reduce the rate, 
Music City‘s case would have been much stronger.  In addition, this case illustrates 
that reasonableness is necessary in post-contract negotiations.  Music City would 
have been wise to terminate the agreement once it became evident that E&A would 
not recognize partial payment as meeting the terms of  the Agreement.  In 
attempting to modify a contract, a transactional lawyer should advise clients to never 
treat silence as acceptance, especially if  the client is setting out the terms.  If  it is 
evident that the opposing party had no intention of  accepting the modification, the 
client should leverage the benefits of  its bargain to renegotiate the terms.  The client 
may end the lease if  the owner is unwilling to renegotiate, provided such a right is 
included in the terms of  the original lease. 
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The Importance of  a Having a Detailed Record for Contract Disputes, 
Ending Disputes Quickly to Reduce Prejudgment Interest, and Precise 
Language in Contracting for Attorneys’ Fees.  ABC Painting Co. v. White Oaks 
Apartments of  Hermitage, No. M2006-00280-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007). 
By Patrick W. Norton 
 In a contract for services between an apartment complex and a contractor, 
the relationship and expectations of  the parties play a critical role.  A contract will 
govern the duties of  the parties, but the court will consider more than just the 
contract when making its ruling.  In ABC Painting Co. v. White Oaks Apartments of  
Hermitage, one party did not keep detailed records to mitigate its damages in a breach 
of  contract claim.  The parties disputed the claim over an extended period of  time 
causing the court to award prejudgment interest.  The contract, however, was too 
ambiguous to allow recovery of  all attorneys‘ fees. 
 ABC Painting Co. (―ABC‖) entered into a contract with White Oaks 
Apartments of  Hermitage (―White Oaks‖) for the interior painting of  certain 
apartments.  The contract stated that ABC would complete work on a pre-
determined ―cost schedule.‖  The contract also stated that the work should be done 
in a workmanlike manner and that White Oaks would pay ―reasonable costs and 
expenses associated with a collection effort.‖ 
 From May of  2003 to October of  2003, ABC painted 110 apartments and 
submitted invoices totaling $21,255.  White Oaks refused to pay, claiming that the 
work was not completed in a workmanlike manner.  As a result, White Oaks hired 
Hagan Painting and Drywall (―Hagan‖) to correct the problems.  Hagan estimated 
that White Oaks paid between $8,000 and $10,000 to correct ABC‘s mistakes.  ABC 
brought suit against White Oaks for payment, and White Oaks counter-claimed 
arguing that ABC had not completed the work in a workmanlike manner.  At trial, 
the judge, sitting without a jury, ruled that ABC should recover $13,500 for unpaid 
work and $3,500 for attorneys‘ fees. 
On appeal, ABC raised three issues.  First, ABC alleged that the trial court 
erred in failing to award ABC payment of  all unpaid invoices.  Second, ABC argued 
that it deserved prejudgment interest as a part of  its recovery.  Lastly, ABC asserted 
that the trial court erred by not awarding all attorneys‘ fees.  The Tennessee Court of  
Appeals reviewed the record de novo with no presumption of  correctness.  
 On the first issue, the court determined that the trial court erred when it 
failed to award the full amount requested by ABC for the unpaid invoices.  Based on 
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the record, the court noted that the preponderance of  the evidence weighed in favor 
of  ABC.  The court concluded that ABC completed work valued at $21,255 in a 
workmanlike manner.  The court relied on White Oak‘s inability to prove that the 
work from Hagan was done to mitigate ABC‘s mistakes and noted that none of  the 
testimony for mitigation was supported by documentary evidence.  The court stated, 
―White Oaks could have easily reviewed the apartments which ABC painted and 
documented which apartments they found unacceptable.‖  Without this 
documentation, White Oaks did not prove with reasonable certainty that the 
damages awarded to ABC should be offset by mitigation costs.  Thus, the court of  
appeals awarded the full amount to ABC. 
 On the second issue, the court held that the trial court erred when it did not 
award pre-judgment interest with ABC‘s damages.  The court stated that the award 
of  pre-judgment interest is based on ―the principles of  equity‖ and ―the purpose of  
awarding the interest is to fully compensate a plaintiff  for the loss of  the use of  
funds to which he or she was legally entitled, not to penalize a defendant for 
wrongdoing.‖  The court held that pre-judgment interest should be awarded because 
ABC waited over three years to receive its remedy.   
 On the last issue, the court held that the trial court did not err in the amount 
it awarded for attorneys‘ fees.  ABC requested that all attorneys‘ fees be paid.  
Tennessee has adopted the ―American Rule‖ where litigants pay their own fees unless 
the parties contract otherwise.  In the present case, the contract stated that:  
In the event that payment is not made in a timely manner and it 
becomes necessary for ABC Painting to enforce payment, customer 
agrees to pay all costs and expenses of  any legal action or collection 
efforts . . . including but not limited to, reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred as a result of  such breach. 
 The court stated that ―[t]he determination of  reasonable attorneys‘ fees and costs is 
necessarily a discretionary inquiry to the [t]rial [c]ourt, to which the appellate courts 
will defer, absent an abuse of  discretion.‖  Following that precedent, the court 
upheld the trial court‘s determination of  fees.  
 ABC Painting teaches the transactional attorney several lessons. First, in order 
to substantiate a claim of  a breach of  the condition for workmanlike quality, a 
complete record detailing the breach must be kept.  That record should include the 
exact nature of  the breach and the costs it took to correct it.  Second, the court 
established that time is a factor in the determination of  pre-judgment interests; thus 
the transactional attorney should seek to end disputes quickly rather than allowing 
them to continue over several years.  Finally, it is very difficult to contract for full 
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payment of  attorneys‘ fees if  a dispute arises.  Transactional attorneys should ensure 
that the language in the provision asking for attorneys‘ fees does not give the trial 
court enough interpretive leeway to award reasonable fees rather than all fees, 
although such awards are largely within the discretion of  the trial court and a rule of  
reasonableness will undoubtedly apply.  
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Last-Day-Worked Rule Determines when One-Year Statute of  Limitations 
Begins to Run in Workers’ Compensation Cases Involving Gradually 
Occurring Injuries.  Bldg Materials Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2007). 
By Jessica H. Shafer 
 In Tennessee, the last-day-worked rule determines when the statute of  
limitations for workers‘ compensation claims begins to run in cases involving a 
gradually occurring injury.  In Building Materials Corp. v. Britt, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court ruled that the one-year statute of  limitations will begin to run on the first day 
of  work the employee misses due to the work-related injury.   
 Mr. Britt was an employee of  Building Materials Corporation d/b/a GAF 
Materials Corporation (―GAF‖).  Mr. Britt began experiencing back pain in 1996 and 
reported that he sustained a work-related back injury to GAF in 1997.  At that time, 
GAF approved medical treatment for Mr. Britt‘s back pain and Mr. Britt did not miss 
any work.  In August 2001, Mr. Britt reported to his supervisor and the personnel 
manager at GAF that his back pain was worsening.   
Believing that any workers‘ compensation claim by Mr. Britt would be barred 
by the one-year statute of  limitations, GAF filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment 
in the Davidson County Chancery Court in November 2001.  Mr. Britt filed an 
answer and a counterclaim seeking partial disability benefits due to an alleged 
gradually occurring back injury.  At the time of  this filing, Mr. Britt had not missed 
any work due to his back injury.  Finally, on March 31, 2004, Mr. Britt underwent 
surgery and missed his first day of  work related to his injury. 
Although the trial court ruled that Mr. Britt‘s claim was time-barred, the 
appeals panel reversed that holding.  On further appeal, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that Mr. Britt‘s workers‘ compensation claim was not time-
barred and that the last-day-worked rule should be used to identify the date from 
which the statute of  limitations runs.  Under the last-day-worked rule, the statute of  
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limitations begins running on the first day of  work missed due to the injury.  The 
court noted that this rule was consistent with the spirit of  workers‘ compensation 
law.  In addition, the court stated that any other rule might create a ―trap‖ forcing 
employees with gradually occurring injuries to choose between bringing a claim 
before their disability has actually developed or waiting for the injury to gradually 
occur and then finding themselves time-barred from bringing a claim. 
 The court noted that the ―first notice‖ rule had been applied in a few recent 
gradually occurring injury cases.  This rule provided that the statute of  limitations 
begins running when the employee first gives notice of  the injury to his or her 
employer.  In Building Materials Corp., however, the court specifically overruled these 
cases and rejected this test. 
 Because the last-day-worked rule now applies to all workers‘ compensation 
claims for gradually occurring injuries, transactional attorneys should encourage their 
clients to keep detailed records not only of  reports of  work-related injuries, but also 
of  any time missed due to such injuries. This missed time could trigger the one-year 
statute of  limitations for a workers‘ compensation claim and thus provide a possible 
defense to the claim. 
 
INSURANCE LAW 
The Phrase “In Transit” in Cargo Insurance Policies Construed to Include 
Temporary Stops Incidental to Transportation.  Cargo Master, Inc. v. ACE USA 
Ins. Co., No. W2005-02798-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Jan. 19, 2007). 
By John J. Radacsy IV 
The language in an insurance policy determines the scope of  the coverage 
purchased.  When a party seeks to recover under a policy, the meaning of  particular 
words often becomes the subject of  litigation.  This was the situation presented in 
Cargo Master, Inc. v. ACE USA Insurance Co., where the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
analyzed the meaning of  the phrase ―in transit‖ in a cargo insurance policy. 
In March 2000, Cargo Master, Inc. (―Cargo Master‖) into a carrier agreement 
with S&A Trucking, an independent trucking company.  S&A Trucking, which was 
to transport certain goods for Cargo Master, promised to assume liability if  the 
goods become lost or damaged while in S&A Trucking‘s possession or control.  
Consequently, S&A Trucking obtained a motor truck cargo insurance policy from 
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ACE USA Insurance Company (―ACE Insurance‖).  The policy stated, in pertinent 
part: 
We will pay for loss to Covered Property for any one of  the Covered Causes 
of  Loss.   
1. Covered Property 
Covered property means lawful goods and 
merchandise of  others that you have accepted for 
transportation under a bill of  lading, tariff, shipping 
receipt or contract of  carriage as a common or 
contract motor carrier or when you trip lease to 
another motor carrier.  Such property is covered while 
in due course of  transit while either in your care, custody 
or control or in the custody of  a connecting carrier. 
(emphasis added.) 
Subsequently, S&A Trucking undertook transportation of  a shipment of  tires 
for Cargo Master.  The tires belonged to a third party, Continental Tire, Inc. 
(―Continental‖).  On November 26, 2001, during the course of  shipment, S&A 
Trucking‘s driver parked the trailer containing the tires behind a shopping mall in 
Memphis, Tennessee and departed with the tractor, leaving the trailer unattended for 
the night.  When the driver returned the next morning, he noticed the tires had been 
stolen.   
S&A Trucking filed a claim with ACE Insurance for the loss of  the tires.  
ACE Insurance denied the claim, asserting that the policy had expired for failure to 
pay the required premiums.  Ultimately, Cargo Master paid Continental $35,700.61 
for the loss of  the tires and filed a breach of  contract suit against S&A Trucking and 
ACE Insurance.  In its answer, ACE Insurance asserted that the policy was in default 
for nonpayment of  premiums.  Alternatively, it argued that the insurance policy did 
not cover the loss because the unattended trailer was not ―in the course of  transit,‖ 
as required by the policy, when the theft occurred. 
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The 
trial judge ruled that there was no coverage under the insurance policy because the 
tires were not ―in transit‖ at the time they were stolen.  Reasoning that ―in transit‖ as 
meant ―in [the] course of  passing from point to point,‖ the trial court stated, ―the 
expectation is not that a load of  cargo in a trailer is going to be left in a public 
parking lot.‖  Thus, the trial judge granted ACE Insurance‘s motion for summary 
judgment and did not address the question of  whether the policy was in default for 
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failure to pay the required premiums.   
The sole issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred in 
granting ACE Insurance‘s motion for summary judgment on the basis that, at the 
time of  the theft, the shipment of  tires was not ―in the course of  transit‖ as 
contemplated by the cargo insurance policy.  The court of  appeals noted that the 
rules of  construction pertaining to contracts in general are also applied when specific 
language in an insurance policy is being construed.  The ultimate goal is to give effect 
to express language where possible, thereby honoring the presumed intentions of  the 
contracting parties.  Accordingly, the precise language used in an insurance policy is 
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and ambiguous terms are construed against the 
insurer.  The court also stated that questions concerning the scope of  an insurance 
policy are matters of  law rather than fact and may be resolved by summary judgment 
where the factual circumstances related to the transaction are not in dispute.       
Although the policy issued by ACE Insurance did not define the phrase ―in 
due course of  transit,‖ the court observed that it had previously construed this 
phrase in Williams v. Berube & Associates, 26 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).  In 
Williams, the plaintiff ‘s trailer was left unattended for more than one week before its 
contents were stolen.  The Williams Court held that the phrase ―in transit‖ 
contemplates only ―the time that cargo is actually in route from one place to the 
next.‖  Thus, the Williams Court affirmed the lower court‘s holding that the shipment 
was not ―in transit‖ at the time the merchandise was stolen. 
In Cargo Master, the court distinguished the facts in Williams.  Williams 
involved cargo ―left on a lot, where it was not discovered missing for more than a 
week.‖  Thus, the cargo was ―clearly not ‗in the process of  being shipped, and it was 
not parked overnight in the course of  delivery.‘‖  The Cargo Master case, however, 
involved ―a shipment of  tires [that] was parked behind a shopping center overnight 
and discovered missing the next day.‖  Further, the cargo may have been parked 
overnight due to mechanical problems with the trailer.  Presented with these 
substantially different facts, the court determined that a more comprehensive 
definition of  the phrase ―in transit‖ was necessary.   
The court examined decisions from other jurisdictions that discussed this 
phrase in the context of  determining insurance coverage.  These cases generally held 
that reasonable delays and temporary stops, provided they are related to the 
transportation of  the goods in question, are within the scope of  the definition of  ―in 
transit.‖  Adopting the rulings of  these cases, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held 
that the ―common and ordinary meaning of  the terms ‗in transit‘ and ‗in due course 
of  transit,‘ while limited to cargo that is actually en route from one place to the next, 
contemplates temporary stops which are incidental to the course of  transportation.‖  
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The court added that ―[w]hether an interruption in the actual movement of  the 
cargo is incidental to the course of  transportation depends upon the purpose and 
extent of  the stop.‖   
Because the limited facts in the record did not reveal the reason why S&A 
Trucking‘s driver parked his trailer behind a Memphis mall on the night of  the theft, 
the court reversed the grant of  summary judgment and remanded the case to 
determine whether the overnight stop was incidental to the process of  shipping the 
cargo.  The court stated that ―the issue of  whether cargo remains ‗in transit‘ during 
temporary cessations in actual movement must be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
considering the particular circumstances presented.‖     
In Cargo Master, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals both clarified and expanded 
the scope of  its definition of  the phrase ―in transit‖ as it is applied in cargo 
insurance policies.  Although this decision applies narrowly to only those insurance 
contracts that would cover cargo that is in transit, it is significant because it broadens 
the liability of  those types of  insurers.  This outcome, however, is not surprising; the 
expansion of  the phrase ―in transit‖ to include stops or delays that are incidental to 
the course of  shipping is consistent with the maxim of  construing language 
contained in insurance policies against the insurer.   
 
PROPERTY LAW 
Deficiency Judgments Owed to Creditors: May They Be Reduced if  the 
Creditor Purchases the Property Below the Market Value and Sells the 
Property at Market Value? Lost Mountain Dev. Co. v. King, No. M2004-02663-COA-
R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006). 
By Joshua Mullen 
When a mortgage default occurs, secured creditors may seek a foreclosure 
sale to force the sale of  the mortgaged property to satisfy outstanding debts.  If  the 
foreclosure sale proceeds are insufficient to discharge the debt, the creditor can seek 
a deficiency judgment, requiring the debtor to personally satisfy the difference.  
When the foreclosed property sells at a price significantly below the fair market 
value, the creditor is entitled to a larger deficiency judgment than if  the property 
were sold at the true market value.  If  the creditor is also the entity who buys the 
foreclosed property at a price considerably less than the fair market value, the 
creditor is in a position to earn a windfall by both selling the foreclosed property at a 
large profit and by receiving the deficiency judgment.  
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In Lost Mountain Development Co. v. King, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
determined whether a court could either deny or reduce a deficiency judgment owed 
to a creditor when the same creditor bought the foreclosed property for a price 
significantly below the fair market value and subsequently sold the property for its 
full market value.  The court provided a list of  relevant factors and ultimately 
concluded that a deficiency judgment may be reduced or denied if  it would otherwise 
provide a windfall to the creditor.  
Mr. King sold 4,650 acres of  mountaintop land in Franklin County, 
Tennessee, to the Lost Mountain Development Co. (―Lost Mountain‖) for a 
purchase price of  $4,600,000.  Lost Mountain, a Tennessee general partnership 
consisting of  investors from Florida, intended to develop the property into a private 
gated community.  The partnership members executed personal guaranties on the 
loan.  After Lost Mountain failed to make five consecutive mortgage payments, Mr. 
King instituted foreclosure proceedings.  The parties renegotiated the terms of  the 
loan, Mr. King was immediately paid $800,000, and a new payment schedule was 
established.  Mr. King cancelled his foreclosure proceedings and Lost Mountain 
made the monthly payments, but failed to make an agreed upon final balloon 
payment of  $3.8 million.  
 On October 31, 2001, Lost Mountain made a ―preemptive strike‖ by filing a 
complaint against Mr. King, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of  
contract, and moved to enjoin foreclosure.  Mr. King answered and also filed a 
counter-complaint against Lost Mountain and its associate investors.  Lost Mountain 
filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection and Mr. King filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment against the four primary Lost Mountain investors who personally 
guaranteed the loan and against eight other signatories on the basis of  third party 
liability.  Eventually, the bankruptcy court dismissed Lost Mountain‘s Chapter 11 
proceeding and dismissed with prejudice all the claims against Mr. King.  
 On May 30, 2003, the 4,650 acres were sold in a foreclosure sale and Mr. 
King was the only bidder.  Mr. King purchased the property for $1.1 million and 
then filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting a deficiency judgment of  $4.0 
million.  Later, Mr. King sold a large portion of  property for $3.0 million and 
assigned the purchaser, Mr. Manfull, his rights to the deficiency judgment.  Mr. 
Manfull settled with all of  the Lost Mountain partners except Bemis Smith.  Citing 
Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, the trial court held that Mr. Smith did not present 
evidence of  ―‗irregularity, misconduct, fraud, or unfairness on the part of  the 
mortgagee‘‖ to overcome the presumption that the market value of  the property at 
the time of  foreclosure was equal to the sales price.  As a result, the trial court 
granted summary judgment against Mr. Smith for $4.4 million.  Mr. Smith appealed.  
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 On appeal, Mr. Smith argued that the court should deny or reduce a 
deficiency judgment in situations where such a judgment would result in a windfall 
for the lender and be highly unfair to the borrower.  Mr. Manfull argued that the trial 
court ruled correctly because there was not evidence of  ―‗irregularity, misconduct, 
fraud, or unfairness . . . that caused or contributed to an inadequate price for a court 
of  equity to set aside the sale.‘‖   
 Disagreeing with the trial court, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals first 
determined that Holt v. Citizens Central Bank was not controlling to the case at bar 
because Holt dealt with the issue of  whether a foreclosure sale should be set aside.  
The issue in Lost Mountain Development Co. was not whether a foreclosure sale should 
be set aside, but whether a deficiency judgment should be denied or reduced when 
the creditor was already made whole by purchasing the foreclosed property at a price 
well below the actual market value.    
 After providing a detailed discussion of  the law related to deficiency 
judgments in Tennessee, the court of  appeals ultimately decided that the value of  the 
property sold could be examined in a deficiency judgment case if  there is a charge of  
fraud or if  the foreclosure sales price was grossly inadequate.  Further, the court 
ruled that in the absence of  an allegation of  irregularity, the presumption that the 
foreclosure sales price is the fair market value of  the property prevails.  Finally, when 
a debtor claims that the price was grossly inadequate, the debtor has the burden of  
overcoming that presumption.   
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals explained that the trial court‘s grant of  
summary judgment to Mr. Manfull was inappropriate because Mr. Smith alleged that 
―(1) the foreclosure sales price was grossly inadequate and (2) that the creditor 
unfairly bid that low price, acquired the land, and sought a deficiency judgment that 
would inequitably provide him a windfall.‖   The Tennessee Court of  Appeals ruled 
that Mr. Smith provided enough information to raise a sufficient dispute of  fact.  
Thus, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
The overriding lesson from Lost Mountain Development Co. is that creditors 
entitled to a deficiency judgment should not expect to earn a windfall by both 
purchasing the foreclosed property at a price considerably below market value and 
obtaining a large deficiency judgment.  Tennessee courts may examine the creditor‘s 
purchase price of  the foreclosed property to potentially reduce or deny a deficiency 
judgment to avoid a grossly unfair result.  An attorney advising a creditor placed in 
this situation should set expectations so the client fully appreciates the impact of  
choosing to purchase, or not to purchase, the foreclosed-upon property.   Should the 
creditor still decide to purchase the foreclosed property, he or she should at least 
know that the purchase could potentially reduce or deny their deficiency judgment.   
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An Ordinance that Rezones Property Provides a Sufficient Legal Basis to 
Hold Both Original and Subsequent Developers Liable to Fulfill Any 
Requirements on Which the Zoning Change Was Conditioned.  Metro. Gov’t of 
Nashville & Davidson County v. Barry Constr. Co., No. M2005-01749-COA-R3-CV, 2007 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2007). 
By Lindsey M. Vaughan 
 When a local governmental agency adopts an ordinance rezoning property 
based on a developer‘s preliminary master plan, the developer incurs a legal 
obligation to ensure that any conditions of  that ordinance are met and that 
obligation does not terminate if  the property is later sold.  In Metropolitan Government 
of  Nashville & Davidson County v. Barry Construction Co., the Tennessee Court of  
Appeals held that the conditions and requirements set forth in a preliminary master 
plan are binding not only on the original developer, but also on subsequent 
developers that purchase the restricted property. 
JCH Development Co., Inc. (―JCH‖) induced the City of  Nashville (―City‖) 
to rezone property and approve a planned unit development (―PUD‖) overlay to 
accommodate its project.  The preliminary master plan called for the construction of  
a road across the property to be paid for by the developer.  This road was a major 
factor in the City‘s decision to rezone the property.  The Metropolitan Planning 
Commission (―Planning Commission‖) approved the preliminary master plan, and 
the Metropolitan Council (―Council‖) amended the comprehensive zoning ordinance 
to rezone the property and apply the PUD district overlay. 
Subsequently, JCH sold Phase I, sections 1 and 2 of  the project to Barry 
Construction Co. (―Barry‖).  Barry agreed to bear the cost of  all development, 
including construction of  the road.  Because of  the project‘s configuration, Phase I, 
section 1 included only the north and south ends of  the road, while the middle 
section was part of  Phase I, section 2.  Barry built out Phase I, section 1, including 
the north and south ends of  the road.  Before beginning construction on Phase 1, 
section 2, Barry hired another company to draw up new subdivision plats dividing 
the section into two new parts—Phase I, sections 2 and 3.  Neither of  these new 
subdivision plats included the middle section of  road.  Oblivious to the omission, 
the Planning Commission approved Barry‘s subdivision plats for sections 2 and 3.  
When the Planning Commission realized that neither developer intended to finish 
the road, the City sued both developers.   
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that there was sufficient basis to 
require both developers to complete the road.  With respect to JCH, the ordinance 
and attached preliminary master plan showed definitively that JCH agreed to build 
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and pave the entire length of  parkway in return for the Council‘s rezoning of  the 
property and application of  the PUD district overlay.  When the Council accepted 
JCH‘s offer, JCH incurred a legally enforceable obligation to ensure that the road was 
built and paved during the course of  the development of  the project.  JCH‘s transfer 
of  Phase I to Barry did not terminate its legal obligation to ensure the 
implementation of  the plan. 
The court held Barry similarly liable.  First, the zoning ordinance expressly 
required subsequent developers to complete their part of  the project in strict 
conformance with the adopted final master development plan.  Second, Tennessee 
case law recognizes that a PUD district overlay is a type of  zoning, and the 
preliminary master plan that forms the basis for the approval of  a PUD constitutes a 
set of  legally enforceable development restrictions.  Because they are the equivalent 
of  zoning restrictions, the court agreed with the weight of  authority in other 
jurisdictions that the conditions and requirements of  the preliminary master plan are 
binding not only on the original developer, but also on subsequent developers and 
owners of  property within the PUD.  Third, Barry‘s assertion that any obligation it 
had was extinguished by the Planning Commission‘s approval of  the final subdivision 
plats for Phase I, sections 2 and 3 failed.  Planning commission approval of  a 
subdivision plat is insufficient to alter zoning or create an estoppel against the 
enforcement of  zoning restrictions.  The Planning Commission did not have the 
authority to allow this modification of  the PUD plan without the approval of  the 
Council.  Therefore, the ordinance requirements, including construction of  the road, 
continued to apply.   
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals‘ decision to hold both JCH and Barry 
responsible for completion of  the road serves as a warning to developers who seek 
to circumvent what the local governmental agency has explicitly provided for in 
granting a PUD district overlay.  A developer cannot hope to ―contract away‖ its 
legal obligation by transferring property that was the subject of  the council‘s 
approval of  the PUD district overlay.  Nor can a subsequent developer sidestep the 
conditions and requirements of  the master plan by seeking the council‘s approval for 
successive projects or through creative surveying that simply omits the part of  the 
property subject to the council‘s conditions.   
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TAX LAW 
Executor/Beneficiary of  an Estate Has a Duty of  Consistency in Reporting 
Valuation of  Property on Estate Tax Return as Executor and Own Individual 
Income Tax Return as Beneficiary.   Janis v. Comm’r, 461 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). 
By Ryan C. Edens 
 An executor who is also a beneficiary of  the estate has a duty of  consistency 
in reporting the valuation of  property on his individual income tax return where the 
IRS and the co-executors have previously agreed to the value of  the property for 
estate tax purposes.  Some types of  property, such as collections of  art, are especially 
open to interpretations of  their value.  The duty of  consistency rule prevents a 
taxpayer from changing his or her position as to the value of  such property from 
year to year in ways meant to benefit the taxpayer.  Such was the situation presented 
in Janis v. Commissioner.   
 Conrad and Carroll Janis were the co-executors and the only beneficiaries of  
their father‘s estate, as well as co-trustees and beneficiaries of  a trust established by 
their father for their benefit.  The corpus of  the trust included almost five hundred 
works of  art from their father‘s art gallery, some by well-known artists.  The estate 
had the art collection appraised, then calculated a ―blockage discount‖ meant to 
account for the effects of  placing all of  the pieces on the market at the same time.  
The blockage discount provided for the number of  pieces in the collection, the 
nature of  the works, and other similar factors.  The estate then filed fiduciary income 
tax returns for each year between 1990 and 1992 with the value of  the collection 
reported at a blockage discounted value of  $12,403,207.  This enabled the gallery to 
report a net operating loss each year from 1990 to 1992. 
 After the 1991 tax return was filed, the IRS examined the valuation of  the 
collection and concluded that a blockage discount was appropriate.  However, the 
IRS determined that the actual undiscounted value of  the collection was 
$36,636,630, and the appropriate blockage discounted value was $14,500,000.  
Although the limitation period for assessment against the 1991 estate tax return had 
previously expired, meaning the IRS could not impose tax liability on the difference 
in valuations, Conrad and Carroll consented to the IRS‘s valuation of  the collection 
in January 1994. 
 Beginning in February 1994 and continuing through 1997, Conrad and 
Carroll claimed the undiscounted value of  the collection, $36,636,630, on all 
fiduciary and individual income tax returns, including the amended returns for 1990-
92.  The tax returns used the undiscounted value rather than the discounted value of  
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$14,500,000.  The IRS eventually reviewed the trust tax returns for 1995-97 and the 
individual tax returns of  Conrad Janis and his wife Maria Janis (the ―Janises‖) for the 
same years and discovered the inconsistent claims.  Under the IRS‘s valuation, the 
Janises owed more taxes because they were unable to claim the same net operating 
losses on their returns.  The IRS filed a notice of  deficiency for the Janises‘ 1995-
1997 individual tax returns.  The Janises contested the issue in tax court; however, 
the trial court upheld the deficiencies. 
 On appeal, the Janises raised two issues:  (1) whether the tax court clearly 
erred in its valuation of  the art collection; and (2) whether the tax court erred in 
holding that the Janises violated a duty of  consistency in reporting the value of  the 
art collection in their tax returns from year to year.  Regarding the first issue, the 
Ninth Circuit follows the rule that the valuation of  property is a finding of  fact to be 
reversed only for clear error.  Thus, the Janises had to prove that the tax court clearly 
erred in determining that application of  the blockage discount was appropriate in 
determining the value of  the art collection.  Un-swayed by the Janises argument, the 
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Janises and held that the tax court did not clearly err 
in its valuation of  the art collection.  Because the Janises agreed with the IRS on the 
$14,500,000 valuation for estate tax purposes, this valuation should have also been 
reflected on the Janises individual income tax returns.  The tax court held that the 
value of  the art collection should have been lower than the Janises reported on their 
income tax returns and because the tax court‘s property valuation is a finding of  fact, 
the district court upheld the valuation for lack of  clear error.  
 Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the tax court erred in holding that 
the Janises violated a duty of  consistency.  The duty of  consistency, as invoked by 
the Ninth Circuit and the tax court, requires ―(1) a representation or report by the 
taxpayer; (2) on which the Commission[er] has relied; and (3) an attempt by the 
taxpayer after the statute of  limitations has run to change the previous 
representation or to recharacterize the situation in such a way as to harm the 
Commissioner.‖ 
 The tax court ruled that under the duty of  consistency, the Janises were 
―bound to use the collection‘s discounted value as their basis for purposes of  
calculating the gallery‘s [cost of  goods sold] for 1990 through 1997.‖  Consequently, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that the Janises‘ individual tax returns for 1995 through 
1997 contained deficiencies. 
 The Ninth Circuit upheld the tax court‘s ruling on all three elements of  the 
duty of  consistency.  Conrad and Carroll‘s agreement as executors of  the estate that 
the fair market value of  the collection was $14,500,000 satisfied the first element – 
representation by the taxpayer.  Although the Janises argued that the agreement for 
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estate tax purposes did not bind them for income tax purposes, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Conrad‘s interests as beneficiary and co-executor of  the estate overlapped.  
Further, the Ninth Circuit opined that allowing inconsistent positions on the estate 
tax returns and the income tax returns would violate the duty of  consistency by 
allowing Conrad to reduce the value of  the taxable estate as a co-executor while 
simultaneously benefiting as an heir.  The second element, reliance by the 
Commissioner, was also satisfied because the IRS relied on the co-executors‘ 
agreement regarding the discounted value.  The IRS‘s allowance of  the statute of  
limitations to run on further assessment of  the 1991 estate tax return satisfied the 
third element a change in position by the taxpayer that is harmful to the 
Commissioner. 
Janis demonstrates the significance of  valuation agreements with the IRS, as 
well as the tax consequences that executory or fiduciary duties might have on an 
individual.  Beneficiaries of  an estate must keep in mind the consequences of  
agreeing to serve as an executor of  an estate.  Co-executors are bound by a duty of  
consistency to report the valuation of  property in their own income tax returns 
equivalent to its value in the estate tax return.  Executors must be careful in 
determining the value of  property in an estate for not only the benefit of  the estate 
itself, but also for any interests they may take as beneficiaries. 
 
WILLS AND ESTATES 
Tennessee Anti-Lapse Statute Does Not Save Gifts to Devisee’s Issue when 
the Language in the Will Allows a Contrary Inference.  In re Estate of  Snapp, No. 
E2006-00933-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 
2007). 
By Andrew Oldham 
 When a will contains ambiguous language, the beneficiaries of  the will often 
call upon the court to interpret the testator‘s intent.  The Tennessee legislature 
recently adopted an anti-lapse statute, which provides that if  a devisee or legatee 
predeceases the testatrix, then the devisee or legatee‘s issue shall take the devised 
interest upon the testatrix‘s death.  However, the issue will only take the devisee‘s 
interest if  the will does not provide or require a different disposition.  The court in 
In re Estate of  Snapp held that the testatrix‘s will did not allow for a gift to be 
transferred to a devisee‘s issue when the devisee did not survive the testatrix. 
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 In Snapp, the testatrix devised to her three sisters her one-quarter interest in a 
farm provided that ―[pursuant to Item VII of  the Will] . . . if  any sister should 
predecease [Snapp], then . . . the surviving sister(s) shall take the deceased sister‘s 
share.‖  Item VIII of  the testatrix‘s Will (the ―Will‖) provided that ―the rest and 
residue of  my estate . . . I give, devise, and bequeath in equal shares unto my three 
sisters.‖   The three sisters were Viola Swingle, Anne E. Fowler, and Lena Mae 
Hartsell.  Swingle died in 1987, Fowler in 1997, and Hartsell in 2002.  The testatrix, 
however, did not die until 2005.  Only two of  the sisters, Swingle and Hartsell, died 
with issue.  Hartsell‘s issue (―Hartsell‖) and Swingle‘s issue (―Swingle‖) brought this 
action seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the disposition of  the estate. 
 Hartsell interpreted the language ―surviving sister(s)‖ to mean that the last 
surviving sister receives the estate at the time of  the testatrix‘s death.  Adopting this 
interpretation would mean Hartsell, who lived the longest, would receive the gifts 
devised to Swingle and Fowler.  Swingle argued that ―surviving sister(s)‖ refers to 
surviving the testatrix, not simply surviving the other sisters.  The trial court 
determined that the anti-lapse statute applied to the gifts devised to Swingle and 
Hartsell because they died with issue, but the statute did not apply to the gift to 
Fowler because she died without issue.  Following this line of  reasoning, the court 
held that 50 percent of  the farm went to Swingle and 50 percent to Hartsell with the 
remainder of  the estate being split in the same manner. 
 On appeal, the parties raised two issues.  First, the parties questioned 
whether the trial court correctly interpreted ―the surviving sister(s)‖ as referring to 
survival of  the testatrix, not survival inter sese.  The cardinal rule in construing a will 
is that the court must attempt to ascertain the intent of  the testator from the natural 
meaning of  the language used in the will.  The natural meaning of  ―surviving‖ is 
―[r]emaining alive.  Living beyond the life of  another or beyond the happening of  
some event so as to be entitled to a distribution of  property or income.‖  Thus, the 
court concluded that ―the only condition guarantying entitlement to the gifts is 
surviving the Testatrix,‖ a feat which none of  the sisters accomplished.  As a result, 
the court held that the gifts to the three sisters lapsed unless the anti-lapse statute 
saved them.   
 Second, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed whether the trial court 
correctly applied the anti-lapse statute to the gifts in Items VII and VIII of  the Will.  
Essentially, the Tennessee anti-lapse statute states that if  the devisee dies before the 
testatrix, leaving issue, the issue takes the gift ―unless a different disposition thereof  
is made or required by the [W]ill.‖  The anti-lapse statute is based on a presumption 
that the testatrix understood and intended that the devised gifts will likely descend to 
the beneficiary‘s issue. The purpose of  the statute is to further this presumed intent 
unless the will expresses a material intent to the contrary.  The court concluded that 
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the survivorship clauses expressed such contrary intent.  The language in Item VII 
explicitly conditioned the sisters‘ gifts upon the sisters‘ surviving the testatrix.  
Furthermore, the court presumed that the testatrix was ―acquainted with applicable 
rules of  law when executing the [W]ill.‖  Based on this reasoning, the court must 
presume that the testatrix knew that her sisters‘ predeceasing her raised the question 
of  partial intestacy.   Therefore, the court concluded that the testatrix knew that 
partial intestacy would result, and still chose not to alter her Will.   
Following this conclusion, the court rejected Swingle‘s other argument that 
the rule against partial intestacy required application of  the anti-lapse statute.  The 
presumption that someone did not intend to die intestate as to any part of  his or her 
property is only applicable when a contrary intent does not exist, and such 
presumption does not apply in situations where the testatrix has simply failed to 
make a complete disposition of  the estate.  The court also rejected Swingle‘s 
contentions that the gift should be implied and that In re Estate of  Harper, an 
analogous Tennessee Court of  Appeals case, does not apply.  Courts must construe 
what the testatrix has written or published and will only imply a gift where it is 
absolutely necessary to take such action. Additionally, the court found Harper very 
persuasive on account of  the similarity between the testamentary language found in 
that case and the language in Snapp‘s Will.  In addition, numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions support the holding in Harper.  Based on these findings, the court 
ultimately held that the anti-lapse statute did not apply to the gifts in Items VII and 
VIII and that the entire residuary estate would therefore pass by intestate succession.  
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with 
these holdings. 
As Snapp illustrates, the foundation of  proper estate planning is still the 
proper drafting of  testamentary language.  All of  the rules of  interpretation aside, 
the most important factor for determining the intent of  a testatrix is the language of  
her will.  Although the purpose of  the anti-lapse statute and the rule against partial 
intestacy is to further a presumed intent that the testatrix‘s meant for the gifts to pass 
on to the issue, these rules will not save gifts in the face of  contrary language in the 
will.  When such contrary language exists, the anti-lapse statute cannot apply, and the 
state‘s intestacy statute must govern the disposition of  the incomplete gifts.  A 
transactional attorney should advise his client to avoid ambiguous language and 
should fully explain all possible scenarios or results stemming from the language 
chosen for the client‘s will.  
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